All of the world's religions refer to death in some way. Everyone is somewhat familiar with stories about where we go or what happens to us after death. From an early age, we have all heard stories of heaven or hell or some other version of paradise. Many of us believed such stories, and a great number of us still do. When considering that such stories manage to persist in modern times, an age of science and logic, we can be (...) sure that death is an issue to which humans attach great importance. In a sense, the idea of an afterlife can be a great source of comfort to those whose death is imminent, as well as to their loved ones. Those who have led especially difficult lives can look forward to a more pleasant world, while those who have enjoyed happiness and abundance have the chance to experience more good fortune. To those left behind, the idea of an afterlife presents the chance to meet a loved one again. We may not be conscious of it, but such hopes and expectations stay with us throughout our lives. If such an afterlife does exist, then there is no reason to avoid or fear death. Moreover, if we believe that another life awaits us, then we would believe that we are only separated from our loved ones temporarily before being reunited with them later on. (shrink)

1. Yŏn'gyŏngjae Sŏng Hae-ŭng. "Yŏn'gyŏngjae chŏnjip", innŭn sasil ŭl kŭdaero kirok hada -- 2. P'ungsŏk Sŏ Yu-gu. "Imwŏn kyŏngjeji", hŭlkuk kwa chongittŏk in hangmun ŭn anŭrira -- 3. Oju Yi Kyu-gyŏng. "Ojuyŏn munjang chŏnsan'go", pakhak kwa kojŭnghak ŭro modŭn kŏt ŭl pyŏnjŭng hara -- 4. Tasan Chŏng Yag-yong. "Mongmin simsŏ", sidae rŭl ap'ahago paeksŏngdŭl ŭi pich'am han sam e punno haeya handa -- 5. Ch'ujae Cho Su-sam. "Ch'ujae chip", nara ka mangharyŏmyŏn pandŭsi yomul i naonda -- 6. Nakhasaeng Yi (...) Hak-kyu. "Yŏngnam akpu", mal hanŭn cha nŭn choe ka ŏpta -- 7. Kuhwajae Hong Sŏng-mo. "Tongguk sesigi", sot e kadŭkhan kuk ŭl han sutkal ro mat poda -- 8. Hosan Cho Hŭi-ryong. "Sŏgu mangnyŏllok", hanŭl arae kajang t'ongk'wae han il ida -- 9. Sŏp'a Yu Hŭi. "Munt'ong", ilsaeng ŭl nŭl sibi sok esŏ saranne -- 10. Hyegang Ch'oe Han-gi. "Kihak", taedong ilt'ong ŭi isang segye rŭl kuhyŏn hada -- 11. Kosanja Kim Chŏng-ho. "Taedong yŏjido", chido ro ch'ŏnha ŭi hyŏngse rŭl salp'il su itta -- 12. Paegun Sim Tae-yun. "Pongni chŏnsŏ", mani ilgŭlsurok pongni ka tŏuk manajinda -- 13. Suun Ch'oe Che-u. "Tonggyŏng taejŏn", hangmun ŭro marhajamyŏn 'tonghak' irago haeya handa -- 14. Tongmu Yi Che-ma. "Kyŏkch'igo", i ch'aek i ch'ŏllima ka toeji ank'ennŭn'ga? (shrink)

本书汇集了各种报告或讲座中具有代表性的一部分,旨在创设一种民主自由的学术氛围,使各种观点、理论相互切磋、撞击,让读者置身于一个清美高洁,又五彩斑斓的学术百花园。.

Counterfactuals are inherently ambiguous in the sense that the same counterfactual may be true under one mode of counterfactualization but false under the other. Many have regarded the ambiguity of counterfactuals as consisting in the distinction between forward-tracking and backtracking counterfactuals. This is incorrect since the ambiguity persists even in cases not involving backtracking counterfactualization. In this paper, I argue that causal modeling semantics has the resources enough for accounting for the ambiguity of counterfactuals. Specifically, we need to distinguish two (...) types of causal manipulation, which I call “intervention” and “extrapolation” respectively. To intervene in a causal model M is to change M’s structural equations in some specific ways, while to extrapolate M is to change the value assignment of M’s variables in some specific ways. I argue that intervention and extrapolation offer a natural explanation for the ambiguity of counterfactuals. (shrink)

Recent scandals allegedly linked to CEO compensation have brought executive compensation and perquisites to the forefront of debate about constraining executive compensation and reforming the associated corporate governance structure. We briefly describe the structure of executive compensation, and the agency theory framework that has commonly been used to conceptualize executives acting on behalf of shareholders. We detail some criticisms of executive compensation and associated ethical issues, and then discuss what previous research suggests are likely intended and unintended consequences of some (...) widely proposed executive compensation reforms. We explicitly discuss the following recommendations for reform: require greater independence of compensation committees, require executives to hold equity in the corporation, require greater disclosure of executive compensation, increase institutional investor involvement in corporate governance (including executive compensation), and require firms to expense stock options on their income statements. We provide a brief summary discussion of ethical issues related to executive compensation, and describe possible future research. (shrink)

According to the no-miracle argument, scientific realism is the only view that does not render the predictive success of scientific theories miraculous. Against the no-miracle argument, selectionists argue that the predictive success of scientific theories is a product of them being subject to a selection process that weeds out predictively unsuccessful theories. Against selectionism, I argue that the selectionist explanation is not an alternative to the realist one. More precisely, I draw on a standard framework in behavioral biology, known as (...) “Tinbergen’s four questions,” and argue that selectionism and realism are aimed at answering different questions and that they are complementary to each other, instead. (shrink)

A number of philosophers have recently proposed several alleged cases of “knowledge from falsehood,” i.e., cases of inferential knowledge epistemised by an inference with a false crucial premise. This paper examines such cases and argues against interpreting them as cases of knowledge from falsehood. Specifically, I argue that the inferences in play in such cases are in no position to epistemise their conclusions.

Philosophers have long analyzed the truth-condition of counterfactual conditionals in terms of the possible-worlds semantics advanced by Lewis [13] and Stalnaker [23]. In this paper, I argue that, from the perspective of philosophical semantics, the causal modeling semantics proposed by Pearl [17] and others (e.g., Briggs [3]) is more plausible than the Lewis-Stalnaker possible-worlds semantics. I offer two reasons. First, the possible-worlds semantics has suffered from a specific type of counterexamples. While the causal modeling semantics can handle such examples with (...) ease, the only way for the possible-worlds semantics to do so seems to cost it its distinctive status as a philosophical semantics. Second, the causal modeling semantics, but not the possible-worlds semantics, has the resources enough for accounting for both forward-tracking and backtracking counterfactual conditionals. (shrink)

Gender plays an important role in various aspects of second language acquisition, including lexicon learning. Many studies have suggested that compared to males, females are less likely to experience boredom, one of the frequently experienced deactivating negative emotions that may impair language learning. However, the contribution of boredom to gender-related differences in lexicon learning remains unclear. To address this question, here we conducted two experiments with a large sample of over 1,000 college students to explore the relationships between gender differences (...) in boredom and lexicon learning. In Experiment 1, a cohort of 527 participants completed the trait and state boredom scales as well as a novel lexicon learning task without awareness of the testing process. In Experiment 2, an independent cohort of 506 participants completed the same novel lexicon learning task with prior knowledge of the testing procedure. Results from both experiments consistently showed significant differences between female and male participants in the rate of forgetting words and the state boredom scores, with female participants performing better than male participants. Furthermore, differences in state boredom scores partially explained differences in the rate of forgetting words between female and male participants. These findings demonstrate a novel contribution of state boredom to gender differences in lexicon learning, which provides new insights into better language-learning ability in females. (shrink)

Inspired by the application of CycleGAN networks to the image style conversion problem Zhu et al., this paper proposes an end-to-end network, DefogNet, for solving the single-image dehazing problem, treating the image dehazing problem as a style conversion problem from a fogged image to a nonfogged image, without the need to estimate a priori information from an atmospheric scattering model. DefogNet improves on CycleGAN by adding a cross-layer connection structure in the generator to enhance the network’s multiscale feature extraction capability. (...) The loss function was redesigned to add detail perception loss and color perception loss to improve the quality of texture information recovery and produce better fog-free images. In this paper, the novel Defog-SN algorithm is presented. This algorithm adds a spectral normalization layer to the discriminator’s convolution layer to make the discriminant network conform to a 1-Lipschitz continuum and further improve the model’s stability. In this study, the experimental process is completed based on the O-HAZE, I-HAZE, and RESIDE datasets. The dehazing results show that the method outperforms traditional methods in terms of PSNR and SSIM on synthetic datasets and Avegrad and Entropy on naturalistic images. (shrink)

Several authors have recently argued against intellectualism, the view that one’s epistemic position with respect to p depends exclusively on one’s truth-relevant factors with respect to p. In this paper, I first examine two prominent arguments for the anti-intellectualist position and find both of them wanting. More precisely, I argue that these arguments, by themselves, are underdetermined between intellectualism and anti-intellectualism. I then manifest the intuitive plausibility of intellectualism by examining the ordinary conversational pattern of challenging a claim.

Balanced time perspective is associated with optimal social functioning and facilitates adaptation to pressure and changes in the environment. Previous studies have found that mindfulness is positively associated with and might promote balanced time perspective. However, the mechanism through which mindfulness affects balanced time perspective remains unexplored. The purpose of the present study was to investigate the mediating role of self-compassion and subjective well-being in the relationship between mindfulness and balanced time perspective. A total of 754 Chinese college students, aged (...) 17–27 years, completed the Chinese versions of the Five-Facet Mindfulness Questionnaire, Self-Compassion Scale, Subjective Well-Being Scale, and Zimbardo Time Perspective Inventory. There were significant positive correlations between mindfulness, self-compassion, subjective well-being, and balanced time perspective. Structural equation modeling indicated that in addition to the direct influence of mindfulness on balanced time perspective, self-compassion and subjective well-being played a partial mediating role. On the basis of these findings, we conclude that mindfulness has an important positive influence on balanced time perspective, and highlight the crucial role of the self-compassion in cultivating an individual's balanced time perspective. Limitations of the present study are also discussed. (shrink)

To resolve the lottery paradox, the “no-justification account” proposes that one is not justified in believing that one's lottery ticket is a loser. The no-justification account commits to what I call “the Harman-style skepticism”. In reply, proponents of the no-justification account typically downplay the Harman-style skepticism. In this paper, I argue that the no-justification reply to the Harman-style skepticism is untenable. Moreover, I argue that the no-justification account is epistemically ad hoc. My arguments are based on a rather surprising finding (...) that the no-justification account implies that people living in Taiwan typically suffer from the Harman-style skepticism. (shrink)

Simion and Kelp explain the trustworthiness of an AI based on that AI’s disposition to meet its obligations. Roughly speaking, according to Simion and Kelp, an AI is trustworthy regarding its task if and only if that AI is obliged to complete the task and its disposition to complete the task is strong enough. Furthermore, an AI is obliged to complete a task in the case where the task is the AI’s etiological function or design function. This account has a (...) strength in that it can provide a unificatory rationale for the trustworthy-making properties of AIs. According to this account, being explainable, being safe, and being transparent are the trustworthy-making properties of an AI because an AI can fulfill its etiological or design functions in the case where it is explainable, safe, and transparent. This paper shows that though Simion and Kelp’s account has a strength, this account is not satisfactory for two reasons. The first reason is that an AI’s trustworthiness is not determined just by the AI’s disposition to meet obligations, and the second reason is that it is difficult to explain how an AI’s etiological function and design function have to do with that AI’s obligations. To provide a full-fledged account, Simion and Kelp should dismiss these concerns. (shrink)

It is widely accepted that our initial intuitions regarding knowledge attributions in stakes-shifting cases (e.g., Cohen’s Airport) are best explained by standards variantism, the view that the standards for knowledge may vary with contexts in an epistemically interesting way. Against standards variantism, I argue that no prominent account of the standards for knowledge can explain our intuitions regarding stakes-shifting cases. I argue that the only way to preserve our initial intuitions regarding such cases is to endorse position variantism, the view (...) that one’s epistemic position may vary with contexts in an epistemically interesting way. Some had argued that epistemic position is incompatible with intellectualism. In reply, I point out that position variantism and intellectualism are compatible, if one’s truth-relevant factors with respect to p can vary with contexts in an epistemically interesting way. (shrink)

The instrumental benefits of firm’s CSR activities are contingent upon the stakeholders’ awareness and favorable attribution. While social media creates an important momentum for firms to cultivate favorable awareness by establishing a powerful framework of stakeholder relationships, the opportunities are not distributed evenly for all firms. In this paper, we investigate the impact of CSR credentials on the effectiveness of social media as a stakeholder-relationship management platform. The analysis of Fortune 500 companies in the Twitter sphere reveals that a higher (...) CSR rating is a strong indicator of an earlier adoption, a faster establishment of online presence, a higher responsiveness to the firm’s identity, and a stronger virality of the messages. Incidentally, the higher CSIR rating is also found to be associated with the stronger virality. Our findings also suggest that socially responsible firms can harvest proactive stakeholders’ participation without investing more resources. As the first study that conceptualizes the social media as a proponent of CSR, this paper contends that “being socially responsible” makes more practical sense for firms with the rise of social media. (shrink)

Is the societal-level of analysis sufficient today to understand the values of those in the global workforce? Or are individual-level analyses more appropriate for assessing the influence of values on ethical behaviors across country workforces? Using multi-level analyses for a 48-society sample, we test the utility of both the societal-level and individual-level dimensions of collectivism and individualism values for predicting ethical behaviors of business professionals. Our values-based behavioral analysis indicates that values at the individual-level make a more significant contribution to (...) explaining variance in ethical behaviors than do values at the societal-level. Implicitly, our findings question the soundness of using societal-level values measures. Implications for international business research are discussed. (shrink)

Two studies investigated the development of infants' visual preferences for the human body shape. In Study 1, infants of 12,15 and 18 months were tested in a standard preferential looking experiment, in which they were shown paired line drawings of typical and scrambled bodies. Results indicated that the 18-month-olds had a reliable preference for the scrambled body shapes over typical body shapes, while the younger infants did not show differential responding. In Study 2, 12- and 18-month-olds were tested with the (...) same procedure, except that the typical and scrambled body stimuli were photographic images. The results of Study 2 again indicated that only the 18-month-olds had a reliable preference for the scrambled body shapes. This finding contrasts sharply with infants' precocious preferences for human faces, suggesting that infants' learning about human faces and human bodies follow different developmental trajectories. (C) 2002 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved. (shrink)

Previous research on corporate community involvement (CCI) initiatives indicates that such behaviour is critical for building neighbourhood relationships and extending corporate influence in the community, but there is little theoretical work that provides a clear picture of managing the nature of the initiatives from different stakeholder management approaches. Drawing from theoretical insights of stakeholder theory and the concept of social capital, this article proposes nine strategic directions for CCI initiatives, and concludes by discussing the management implications of the proposed strategic (...) directions. Our proposed approaches have the potential to improve current understanding and practice of corporations and their CCI initiatives. (shrink)

Some cases show that counterfactual conditionals (‘counterfactuals’ for short) are inherently ambiguous, equivocating between forward-tracking and backtracking counterfactu- als. Elsewhere, I have proposed a causal modeling semantics, which takes this phenomenon to be generated by two kinds of causal manipulations. (Lee 2015; Lee 2016) In an important paper (Hiddleston 2005), Eric Hiddleston offers a different causal modeling semantics, which he claims to be able to explain away the inherent ambiguity of counterfactuals. In this paper, I discuss these two semantic treatments (...) and argue that my (bifurcated) semantics is theoretically more promising than Hiddleston’s (unified) semantics. (shrink)

We construct a causal-modeling semantics for both indicative and counterfactual conditionals. As regards counterfactuals, we adopt the orthodox view that a counterfactual conditional is true in a causal model M just in case its consequent is true in the submodel M∗, generated by intervening in M, in which its antecedent is true. We supplement the orthodox semantics by introducing a new manipulation called extrapolation. We argue that an indicative conditional is true in a causal model M just in case its (...) con- sequent is true in certain submodels M∗, generated by extrapolating M, in which its antecedent is true. We show that the proposed semantics can account for some important minimal pairs nicely and naturally. We also prove a theorem showing under what conditions intervention and extrapolation will yield the same result, and thus explain how counterfactual and indicative conditionals would behave in a causal-modeling semantics. (shrink)

The long-periodic/infinite discrete Gabor transform is more effective than the periodic/finite one in many applications. In this paper, a fast and effective approach is presented to efficiently compute the Gabor analysis window for arbitrary given synthesis window in DGT of long-periodic/infinite sequences, in which the new orthogonality constraint between analysis window and synthesis window in DGT for long-periodic/infinite sequences is derived and proved to be equivalent to the completeness condition of the long-periodic/infinite DGT. By using the property of delta function, (...) the original orthogonality can be expressed as a certain number of linear equation sets in both the critical sampling case and the oversampling case, which can be fast and efficiently calculated by fast discrete Fourier transform. The computational complexity of the proposed approach is analyzed and compared with that of the existing canonical algorithms. The numerical results indicate that the proposed approach is efficient and fast for computing Gabor analysis window in both the critical sampling case and the oversampling case in comparison to existing algorithms. (shrink)

Recent literature has seen a surging interest in the modal principle involved in the Gettier-style thought experiments. According to the necessitation thesis, the modal principle underlying the Gettier-style thought experiments takes the form of a principle of necessitation. It is widely agreed that the necessitation thesis is seriously threatened by the problem of deviant realizations. Based on the Gricean pragmatic theory of communication, I defend the necessitation thesis against the problem of deviant realizations. The present account bears some significant similarities (...) to Pierre Saint-Germier’s account. After comparing and contrasting these two accounts, I argue that the differences between them actually speak in favor of the present account over Saint-Germier’s one. (shrink)

Reasons evidentialism is the view that normative reasons can be analyzed in terms of evidence about oughts (i.e., propositions concerning whether or not S ought to phi). In this paper, I defend a new reason-evidentialist account according to which normative reasons are evidence against propositions of the form S ought not to phi. The arguments for my view have two strands. First of all, I argue that my view can account for three difficulty cases, cases where (i) a fact is (...) both a reason for S to phi and a reason for S not to phi, (ii) a fact is both evidence for the proposition that S ought to phi and evidence for the proposition that S ought not to phi, and (iii) the subject is genuinely torn, as far as reasons are concerned, between phi-ing and not phi-ing. Second, I argue that my view can account for what a reason against S phi-ing is. (shrink)

The stakes-shifting cases suggest that pragmatic factors such as stakes play an important role in determining our intuitive judgments of whether or not S knows that p. This seems to be in conflict with intellectualism, according to which pragmatic factors in general should not be taken into account, when considering whether or not S knows that p. This paper develops a theory of judgments of knowledge status that reconciles intellectualism with our intuitive judgments regarding the stakes-shifting cases. I argue that (...) pragmatic factors affect only our epistemic perspectives, i.e., the ways in which we evaluate S’s epistemic position. Therefore, pragmatic factors only have an indirect impact on our judgments of knowledge status. (shrink)

In this paper, I defend the thesis that knowledge is the norm of assertion. I first examine three prominent “counterexamples”: false assertion, selfless assertion, and assertion based on mere justified true belief. I argue that they all fail to square well with our ordinary intuitions. However, the contemporary debate over the norm of assertion depends heavily on the method of counterexamples, whose crux is to prompt our intuitions regarding the appropriateness (or inappropriateness) of a certain kind of assertions. This method (...) has its limits as sometimes the debate simply boils down to a clash of intuitions. I think we can do better. In the second part of the paper, I construct a positive argument for the knowledge norm, showing that the knowledge norm can be derived from the general account of the conversational role of assertion. I argue that in order for assertion to play the role it plays in conversation, the knowledge norm must hold. (shrink)

BackgroundHealth screening is undertaken to identify individuals who are deemed at higher risk of disease for further diagnostic testing so that they may possibly benefit from interventions to modify the natural course of disease. In Singapore, screening tests are widely available in the form of a package, which bundles multiple tests in one session and commonly includes non-recommended tests. There are various ethical issues associated with such testing as they may not be clinically appropriate and can result in more harm (...) than benefit. This article describes the practice of health screening packages, identifies the ethical issues arising from such packages and discusses the implications of these ethical issues on policy and practice of screening in Singapore.MethodsA content analysis of the websites of providers offering general health screening packages to individuals was conducted. A total of 14 health screening package providers were analysed for how packages were conducted and promoted, how clinically appropriate screening tests were, and the price range and composition of screening packages. A normative ethical analysis based on the four principles approach of beneficence, non-maleficence, autonomy and justice in biomedical ethics was used.ResultsTwelve of the 14 providers included non-recommended tests such as tumour markers, treadmill stress tests and MRI scans in their general health screening packages. Package prices ranged from S$26 to S$10,561, with providers charging higher when more tests were included. Health screening packages were broadly conducted in three stages: the offer and selection of a health screening package; medical assessment and performance of screening tests; a post-screening review. While material provided by all providers was factual, there was no information on the potential risks or harms of screening.ConclusionSeveral ethical issues were identified that should be addressed with regard to health screening packages in Singapore. A key issue was the information gap between providers and patients, which may result in patients undergoing inappropriate testing that may be more harmful than beneficial. Health screening packages can stimulate unnecessary demand for healthcare and contribute to an inequitable distribution of healthcare resources. (shrink)

Intuitively, knowledge is distinctively valuable, i.e., knowledge is more valuable than any of its proper parts. Call it “the distinctive value thesis.” Recently, the distinctive value thesis has been forcefully challenged by three arguments, which I call “the swamping argument,” “the generalized swamping argument,” and “the ad hoc argument,” respectively. These three arguments rely on what I will call “epistemic veritism,” the view that the distinctive value of knowledge is parasitic on the value of truth. Against these arguments, I argue (...) that not only is epistemic veritism compatible with the distinctive value thesis, the former in effect implies the latter. My argument depends on the idea that justification enough for knowledge does not contain or presuppose certain falsehoods in a way that mere justification does. (shrink)